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We explore two methods of incorporating bottom-up abatement cost estimates into top-down 
modeling: economy-wide and sector-specific. Carbon emissions depend basically on 
technology and scale. Given the technology options, abatement is possible without a 
substantial reduction in scale. Otherwise the change must come purely through a reduction in 
demand. Our analysis shows that the cost of environmental policy is considerably 
overestimated by top-down models if a bottom-up abatement cost curve is not included. Using 
the data for the Swiss economy, we demonstrate two techniques of representing abatement 
function explicitly in a computable general equilibrium model: a traditional and a hybrid 
(discrete technology modeling) approaches. The results suggest that the current climate policy 
in Switzerland will not be able to move the economy towards the required 10% CO2 
reduction. Both approaches provide virtually the same results when calibration process is 









C68, D24, H21, Q52 1 Introduction
The economic costs of environmental policies are determined by both the direct and the
indirect costs of pollution reduction. The direct economic eﬀect are given by the
expert-based marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves and can be captured by bottom-up
models, while indirect eﬀects can be captured by some top-down models, because
engineering models adopt a partial equilibrium framework. The general equilibrium
framework is speciﬁcally designed to represent price-dependent market interactions as well
as the origination and spending of income for diﬀerent agents. On the other hand, the
characteristics of the underlying abatement technologies1 are important for bottom-up
models, but not for top-down models. It is important to represent abatement opportunities
explicitly within the top-down structure.
This paper focuses on the question of how to integrate bottom-up assessments of pollution
abatement options into top-down analyses of economic cost. We cosider computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models. The majority of these models assume that the
abatement technologies are either not available or prohibitively costly compared to fuel
switching and therefore can be neglected in the model. If abatement activities are not
endogenously modeled, then the only way to reduce emissions is to reduce output, when no
substitution is possible. This is not a desirable solution for economies troubled with
unemployment. Nestor and Pasurka (1995) show that imposing common simplifying
assumptions in modelling the impacts of environmental compliance costs may seriously
hamper the ability of CGE models to accurately characterize economic eﬀects. We show
that the economy-wide cost of environmental policy is considerably lower when abatement
technologies are taken into account.
In order to properly assess the economic costs of environmental policy, top-down models
should explicitly include the basic pollution abatement options: (1) inputs substitution, (2)
output-demand reduction, and (3) installation of abatement equipment. The eﬃciency
with which a policy instrument makes use of these three options, determines the intrinsic
abatement cost (Bovenberg et al., 2008). The general idea is illustrated in Figure 1. A
variety of assumptions representing diﬀerent possible behaviour and scenarios could give a
very large range of possibilities for the social marginal cost of emissions (Stern, 2010).
When top-down models include only the ﬁrst two options, the MAC is overestimated
because we ignore the possibility to reduce emission through abatement equipment and
energy eﬃcient technologies are not precisely described. The substitution between capital
and fuels is possible with CGE models, but not between materials (intermediate demand).
If, for example, it is feasible to reduce emission by using fuel-eﬃcient vehicles, a
1By abatement technology (equipment) we mean any technology that reduces pollutants emitted or that
allow to emit less pollution.
1substitution between vehicle cost and fuels should be possible. However, top-down models
does not allow for such substitution when demand for vehicle is considered as an
intermediate demand. Such calculations can therefore give only a weak guide to policy.
On the other hand, bottom-up models consider the options of reducing emissions through a
number of discrete technologies but ignore the interactions between markets, indirect costs,
and social welfare. Such models include behavioral assumptions that allow for new
technologies to penetrate the market more easy, than top-down models. Integrating
bottom-up estimations with top-down modeling allows us to generate a MAC curve that
covers all three options of emission reduction. This curve lies below those that consider
only some of these options (Figure 1). It follows that the cost of environmental policy is
overestimated by top-down models if a bottom-up abatement cost curve is not included.
In the early CGE literature, whenever abatement possibility was taken into account, the
abatement cost was modelled only implicitly. Contributions to the ﬁeld include Bergman
(1991), Robinson et al. (1994), Schmutzler and Goulder (1997), Xie and Saltzman (2000),
Conrad (2002), Kiuila and Sleszynski (2003). In these models abatement cost was
determined by the average pollution cleanup rate. The disadvantage of such approach is an
inability to account for the eﬀects of changes in prices brought about by policy reforms
Another commonly used approach is to implement the abatement expenditures through an
emission tax or permits in order to generate MAC curves: Parry et al. (1999), Viguier et al.
(2003), He and Roland-Holst (2005), Pizer et al. (2006), Boehringer et al. (2006), Loisel
(2009). The curves are derived by setting progressively tighter abatement levels and
recording the resulting shadow price of pollutant or by introducing progressively higher
emission taxes and recording the quantity of reduced emissions. Such model-based MACs
do not fully represent the opportunities that may serve future mitigation, because some
technological possibilities to abate are ignored. This means that emission intensities of
output in such models are not fully responsive to market circumstances.
There naturally emerges the question how to integration abatement possibilities and their
direct and indirect costs. Welfare analysis is not possible with bottom-up modeling and
therefore technological possibilities should be an input into top-down model. Such
integration will make it possible to derive MAC schedules that accurately characterize the
economic costs associated with all of the economy’s substitutions, all of the market
adjustments and technological changes that follow from the implementation of a particular
mitigation strategy.
We propose an integration of bottom-up abatement costs with top-down models using
either a smooth curve (traditional approach) or a step curve (hybrid approach). CGE
models provide an environment for both approaches. The ﬁrst approach is a highly
stylized, based on, for example, constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function and
2Source: CGE model described in section 4 of the paper
Figure 1: MAC curves obtained with diﬀerent methodologies (top-down curve: no substitu-
tion possibilities between vehicles and fuels; bottom-up curve: the technological possibilities
for transportation)
requires a precise to evaluation of parameters of the abatement function in order to
replicate the bottom-up cost curve. We apply a non-linear optimization process with an
ordinary least square (OLS) technique to calibrate the parameters of the function. This
requires a formulation of separate from top-down model an optimization problem, that will
“translate” a step curve into a smooth curve. Next, the results are implemented into the
top-down model as parameters. This procedure, though mechanically diﬀerent, is done in
the spirit of Dellink (2005). An alternative techniques are proposed by Hyman et al. (2002)
and Jorgenson et al. (2008).
The second approach does not require a deﬁnition of any additional optimization problems,
because the results from bottom-up model are directly integrated into the top-down model
using an activity analysis framework. The traditional approach is based on the concept of
elasticities, but hybrid approach is not. It speciﬁes technologies as ﬁxed coeﬃcient
activities and therefore reduces the aggregate input substitutability of supply. A ﬂip-ﬂop
feature allows us to deactivate technologies which would run at an economic loss at given
prices. There are a few examples of this approach for electric power: Laroui and van
Leeuwen, eds (1995), Koopmans and Velde (2001), Frei et al. (2003), McFarland et al.
(2004), Jacoby et al. (2006), Laitner and Hanson (2006), Boehringer and Rutherford
(2008), but none for the abatement process. We are ﬁlling this gap.
For each approach we demonstrate two techniques that endogenize the abatement within a
static CGE model: economy-wide and sector-speciﬁc. The ﬁrst method, with an
economy-wide perspective, considers a ﬁxed abatement capacity and the MAC is applied
for the whole economy rather than for a speciﬁc sector. The second method allows for a
sector speciﬁc abatement process and the abatement is proportional to the size of the
sector. Instead of the marginal cost, it calibrates the total cost of abatement and it
requires that the original social accounting matrix (SAM) is rebalanced. Endogenizing
expert-based (bottom-up) abatement cost via either method allows for a consistent
3Table 1: GHG abatement technologies for light duty vehicles in Switzerland
# Technology Abatement Marginal cost
[Mt CO2e/year] [2005 CHF/t CO2e]
1 LDV Gasoline Bundle 1 0.82 -127
2 LDV Diesel Bundle 1 0.47 -104
3 LDV Gasoline Bundle 2 1.12 -81
4 LDV Diesel Bundle 2 0.60 -50
5 LDV Gasoline Bundle 3 0.76 -45
6 LDV Diesel Bundle 3 0.42 -28
7 LDV Gasoline Bundle 4 0.45 -20
8 LDV Diesel Bundle 4 0.17 -6
*The exchange rate was 1.55 CHF/EUR in 2005.
Source: McKinsey study 2009, p.11
assessment of an environmental policy.
We compare both approaches and both methods through a simulation of climate policy in
Switzerland. The transportation sector is one of the two largest sources for greenhouse gas
(GHG) emission in the country. We illustrate our methodology for this sector only.
Speciﬁcally, only the abatement technologies for light duty vehicles (LDV) are considered.
Our work is based on the top-down static model developed by Imhof and Rutherford
(2010) and the bottom-up cost curve was developed in the McKinsey report (2009) 2.
The authors of the engineering study claim that vehicle improvements, based on known
technologies and rendering no change in vehicle characteristics, could reduce Swiss annual
GHG emissions from 13.5 to 8.7 Mt. Their base scenario shows 8 possibilities to reach this
goal (Table 1) with negative cost. We are not going to analyse the credibility of the study,
but just to show the application of our methodology with commonly available expert-based
MAC curve. However, this no regrets structure (negative cost) is inconsistent with CGE
modeling and a reconciliation is required. We have applied an additive adjustment, where
the original marginal cost Ci per technology i is proportionally increased by a constant
a = max(0,mini Ci). This allows us to ﬁt a neoclassical CES function with the McKinsey
technology options.
Our main ﬁnding is that the traditional and the hybrid CGE modelling have virtually the
same results of simulation, unless diﬀerent assumptions are applied. It contradicts the
ﬁndings of Boehringer (1998) and Wing (2006), where the Authors conclude that the
traditional approach underestimates the welfare costs compared to the hybrid approach.
The disadvantage of the hybrid approach is a possibly bounded solution in the case of a
2Our choice of the McKinsey curve is only explained by increasing attention given to it by audience.
4limited number of available technologies. On the other hand, the traditional approach with
smooth abatement function calibration is time consuming, especially for a sector-speciﬁc
method.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 describes two methods
of calibrating abatement function using the traditional approach. The detailed explanation
for the piecewise-smooth representation of a step curve can be found in Kiuila and
Rutherford (2011). The sector-speciﬁc method is in the spirit of Dellink (2005), but we
implement it in a diﬀerent way. Section 3 explains the hybrid approach to implementing
abatement costs with the same two methods. Section 4 outlines the core of the top-down
model and deﬁnes scenarios. Using Swiss data, we discuss the results of climate policy
simulation. Section 5 provides a summary and concluding remarks.
2 Traditional approach
The inclusion of bottom-up information on abatement options into a top-down model in
the traditional way involves (i) a piecewise-smooth approximation that best describes the
bottom-up cost curve, (ii) an integration of the results of the approximation into the
top-down model. We discuss and compare the two alternative methods to represent the
abatement function explicitly into CGE models. Both methods use an OLS technique to
approximate the CES function with a decreasing returns to scale (DRTS) technology, but
diﬀer in substitution possibilities, benchmark abatement level, and aggregation. The
purpose of calibration is to determine the parameters of the abatement function in a way
that would replicate the shape of bottom-up MAC curve.
2.1 Method 1: Economy-Wide
The ﬁrst approach considers abatement possibility as an economy-wide opportunity. This
means that we are not able to link the abatement possibilities to speciﬁc sectors, but we
apply it to the whole economy or region. In this case we model the pollution abatement
service Q using the technical potential X and the technology-speciﬁc capital K. In the case
of transportation sector, the capital is represented by vehicle costs. The potential to reduce
pollution through technical abatement activities provides an upper bound on abatement.
Additional pollution abatement can be achieved through a decrease in economic activity.
The Figure 2 shows a schematic tree of the economy-wide approach in a CGE model.
There is no direct connection between the left and the right tree. The left ﬁgure is related















(a) Abatement sector (b) Transportation sector
Figure 2: Economy-wide approach for abatement sector in a CGE model
the cost of abatement will be underestimated with this approach if the abatement data Q
cover only a speciﬁc sector while a CGE model applies it to the whole economy. On the
other hand, if we are not able to distinguish abatement technologies by sector, the
economy-wide method allows us to spread it out to the whole economy.
In our experiment, all abatement technologies are related to LDVs only. Thus we
consciously create a pessimistic scenario in order to compare the results with the second
approach. The transportation sector is deﬁned by a simple Leontief function as shown in
Figure 2b. The emission level is proportional to aggregate demand on transport goods. We
distinguish between the sources of emission in order to be able to apply diﬀerent fuel
standards. Either a carbon tax or a fuel standard would have to be proportional to the
emissions level.
The abatement sector (Figure 2a) is deﬁned as a CES function based on the following
calibration procedure, where the abatement process is characterised by DRTS technologies.
When abatement capacity is in ﬁxed supply X = ¯ X, we may represent DRTS technology
with a production function3 of constant returns to scale (CRTS):







+ (1 − θ)
!σ/(σ−1)
(1)
where ¯ Q, ¯ K and ¯ X are the reference levels of variables, σ shows the substitution possibility
between the abatement capacity and the required expenditures on a vehicle, θ is a value
share of vehicle cost in the total cost at the reference point ( ¯ X, ¯ K). The DRTS technology
implies that the abatement level increases less than proportionally with the variable input
(Figure 3). In order to calibrate the abatement function (1), we need to determine the
marginal abatement cost C as a function of output Q. This will allow us to represent the
bottom-up marginal cost curve. A detailed algorithm is discussed in Kiuila and Rutherford
(2011). The scale of output at a given price (equal to marginal cost) is consistent with the
3We use the calibrated share form representation of functions, rather than the classical form. The classical
form representation for the function (1) is Q = φ
￿

















































(a) Abatement cost (b) Calibration result
Figure 3: CES calibration using the economy-wide approach
proﬁt maximization problem. The corresponding inverse supply CES function becomes:
C = ¯ C
￿




Once we have deﬁned the marginal cost function, we are able to approximate the
bottom-up curve. For a given set of technologies i, the MAC curve represents the relation
between potential abatement level and its cost. It has the shape of a step function,
increasing each time the next cheapest technology is introduced, as shown in Figure 3a.
The emission abated by technology i is simply (Qi − Qi−1), while the aggregate abatement
level Qi is an emission reduction cumulative to the upper point of step i. Let us match the
abatement schedule close to the middle point of step i. The objective is to minimize the
sum of a squared distances between the bottom-up step curve and the CES curve:
min





Ci − ˆ Ci
￿2
s.t. ˆ Ci = f( ˆ C, ˆ Q,Qi,θ,σ) ∀i (3)
where the constraint is the inverse supply function (2). Ci and ˆ Ci represent the observed
and the evaluated marginal cost of abatement associated with technology i, while ˆ C is the
calibrated reference marginal cost. The observed levels (Qi,Ci) corresponds to the
bottom-up curve, the evaluated level ( ˆ Q, ˆ C) corresponds to the calibrated point at the
smooth curve.
The result of the calibration using the additively adjusted bottom-up cost from Table 1 is
presented in Figure 3b. The ﬁgure shows the diﬀerence between the bottom-up curve and
the smooth calibrated curve. The calibration point determines the part of the curve where
elasticity of substitution and value share parameter are evaluated. It is (1.3 Mt CO2e, 34
7CHF/t) with θ = 40% and σ = 1.3 in our example. We can see that the reference
abatement level ˆ Q is positive. However, it is not necessary to assume that the abatement
level was greater than zero at the benchmark equilibrium. The advantage of the
economy-wide approach is that in a top-down model we don’t have to assign any
abatement in a benchmark equilibrium (Q = 0 while ˆ Q = 1.3 Mt CO2e) and we can
simulate the abatement possibilities in counterfactual equilibria.
The rest of the parameters in the production function (1) depend on the above values:
¯ K = θ ˆ C ˆ Q and ¯ X = (1 − θ) ˆ C ˆ Q. There is no demand for inputs (K = 0 and X = 0) at the
benchmark, if there is no abatement. The abatement capacity constraint implies that
exogenous supply ¯ X should not be less than the compensated demand








The price of both inputs can be normalized to one. The benchmark marginal cost of
abatement will be zero, if there is no benchmark emissions tax or permits (C = 0 while
¯ C = 34 CHF/t). The supply of variable input K is endogenous. A standard zero proﬁt
condition can be applied.
Thus, we precisely calibrate the abatement function to portray the bottom-up cost curve
within a top-down model.
2.2 Method 2: Sector-speciﬁc
The second approach considers abatement possibilities as a sectorial opportunity. It is
based on total cost instead of marginal cost as in the ﬁrst approach. The basic idea is to
split the sectorial emissions Y into an abatable part A and an unabatable part U (Figure
4). In our example sectoral total abatement cost (TAC) curve shows the relationship
between the LDV-transportation emissions level and the abatement cost. The goal is to
evaluate abatable emission level, but not the abatement level directly as in the previous
approach.
Sectoral output of the abatement process Q is the diﬀerence between abatable gross
emissions (before abatement) A and net emission S. The key assumption is that we observe
(from the social accounting matrix) the sectorial net emissions level X = S + U and using
bottom-up data we proceed to estimate the gross emissions Y = A+U. It is opposite to the
economy-wide approach, where we assumed that the social accounting matrix represents
gross emissions. The Figure 4 shows a schematic tree of the sector-speciﬁc approach in a
top-down model. For simplicity we assume no fuels substitution in transportation. The














Figure 4: Sector-speciﬁc approach for abatement sector in a CGE model
elasticity of substitution) to the activity level of this sector. The emissions level is also
determined only by the activity level of the speciﬁc sector, i.e. Y = ¯ Y .
Calibration of the abatement function is not straightforward under this approach. Instead
of A = f(K,S) we rather simulate Y = f(K,X) to deﬁne the abatement cost function
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where the technology-speciﬁc capital K is represented by the vehicle purchase price, ¯ K and
¯ X are reference levels of the variables, σ shows substitution possibility between emission
and abatement cost, θ = ¯ K/( ¯ PK ¯ K + ¯ PX ¯ X) is a value share of the abatement cost in total
expenditures at the reference point. The isoquant to be calibrated can be deﬁned from (4):
K = ¯ K
￿




Before we start the calibration process, we should identify activities in the convex hull in
order to illustrate precisely which technology “packages” are employed in each activity.
Assume that the abatement technologies are applied sequentially: before the second
technology is installed, the ﬁrst one must already be installed. The bottom-up cost curve,
that is represented by 8 technologies in Figure 3b, corresponds to 24 technology packages
in Figure 5b. The convex hull is our targeted isoquant because it describes the minimal
convex set containing all relevant technologies, i.e. those which could be operated at
positive intensity for some set of reference prices.
It is necessary to calibrate both the isoquant and the isocost because the benchmark price
4The classical form representation for the function (4) is ¯ Y =
φ
￿







( ¯ X − Q)
(a) Abatement cost (b) Calibration result
Figure 5: CES Calibration using the sector-speciﬁc approach
of emission (abatement) and the benchmark abatement level should be greater than zero
under this approach. The reference isocost line ( ¯ PX ¯ X + ¯ PK ¯ K) is deﬁned with the reference
cost of abatement ¯ K, while the calibrated isocost - with the calibrated reference cost
ˆ K ≤ ¯ K. If no carbon tax or permits were applied in the benchmark period, then the
reference cost of abatement should be low in order to ensure a relatively small benchmark
price of emissions in the top-down model. Assuming ¯ K = 0.02 bln CHF and the price of
emission at the level of the ﬁrst carbon tax in Switzerland ( ¯ PX = 12 CHF/t CO2e), this
requires a rebalancing of the social accounting matrix in order to take into account the
existence of the abatement process in the benchmark equilibrium. If we normalize the price
of capital ¯ PK = 1, the calibrated reference cost becomes:
ˆ K = θ( ¯ PX ¯ X + ˆ K) (6)
The objective is to minimize the sum of squared distances between the targeted and the
approximated isoquants. Each activity coeﬃcient should be connected to the closest point
on the targeted isoquant, represented by the convex hull:
min








ˆ Ki − Ki
￿2
(7)
s.t. ˆ Ki = f( ˆ K, ¯ X,Xi,θ,σ) ∧ ˆ K = θ ¯ PX ¯ X/(1 − θ) ∀i
where the ﬁrst constraint is the isoquant (5) and the second constraint is the reference cost
(6). Xi and Ki represent the observed net emissions and the cost of abatement associated
with technology i, while ˆ Xi and ˆ Ki represent the calibrated variables. The results of the
calibration are presented in Figure 5b.
10The graph shows the diﬀerence between the convex hull and the smooth calibrated curve.
The reference point ( ¯ X, ˆ K) determines the part of the curve where the elasticity of
substitution and the value share parameter are evaluated. It is (13.5 Mt CO2e, 0.004 bln
CHF) with θ = 3% and σ = 2 in our example. Note that the reference emission level ¯ X is
not calibrated, but given exogenously. The components of the net emissions also do not
need to be calibrated: ¯ S =
P
i Qi shows the cumulative emissions level within both the
isoquant and the isocost domain, while ¯ U = ¯ X −
P
i Qi shows the emission level out of the
isoquant domain but within the isocost. The abatement level Qi comes from the
bottom-up data and it determines the components of net emissions.
The calibrated abatement cost allows us to deﬁne the abatable gross emissions
ˆ A = ( ¯ PK ˆ K + ¯ PS ¯ S)/ ¯ PA, where 0 < ¯ PA ≤ ¯ PS = ¯ PU = ¯ PX are the reference prices of emission
and they cannot be normalized to unity. It is not possible to calibrate a top-down model
with zero abatement level within this approach, so we have to normalize the benchmark
prices of emissions PS and PU and PA to the reference level ¯ PX = 12 CHF/t CO2e, that is
below the marginal cost of the ﬁrst technology (Figure 3. The price of emissions before
abatement process should not be greater than the price of emissions after abatement. The
calibrated abatement level ˆ Qi = ˆ A − Si is not directly implemented into top-down model
(Figure 4).
The advantage of the sector-speciﬁc approach is that we consider the abatement
possibilities separately in each sector (not uniformly across the economy).
3 Hybrid approach
The technical possibilities to change a production function in a CGE models are usually
represented with a smooth cost curve. It is possible to use a step curve too within
top-down modeling. Rather than describing an abatement possibility by the means of a
CES cost function, we may use activity analysis, i.e. capture abatement possibilities by
Leontief technologies that are active or inactive in equilibrium, depending on their
probability. It yields an analyses of production as an eﬃcient combination of activities.
Besides this direct combination of bottom-up and top-down via activity analysis, it is also
possible either to link both models (soft-linked or hard-linked models) or to focus on one
model type and use a reduced form of the other (as models MERGE or TIMES). In this
paper, we focus on activity analysis only. The advantage of this method is that it
encompasses in a single mathematical format, both the technological details of a
bottom-up model and the economic richness of top-down model. It requires a deﬁnition of
economic equilibrium conditions as a mixed complementarity problem, where the
11substitution possibilities are described by the characteristics of available technologies
(including those which are inactive in the benchmark).













The reference levels are described by the bottom-up data: ¯ Ki = CiQi, ¯ Xi = ¯ Qi = Qi. The
ﬁrst abatement technology is associated with a positive abatement level (Figure 2b),
however all technologies are inactive in the benchmark (Q = 0). Dimensionality imposes a
limitation on the lower bound of decision variables, since they must be associated with
explicit price variables in order to account for income eﬀects. Thus a condition on the
reference quantity is required when the scarcity rent PXi is deﬁned. The reference rent level
is zero, but the endogenous rent is determined by the market clearing condition
¯ Xi ≥ Xi(Qi):
¯ Qi ≥ Qi ⊥ PXi s.t. ¯ Xi > 0
The price of another input is normalized to unity and it does not require the additional
condition on reference quantity of capital. On the other hand, the reference price of
abatement ¯ PQ is zero, but no additional constraint on reference level is required since the
benchmark level of abatement is zero. The market clearing condition determines the
endogenous price: the emissions limit together with
P
i Qi should not be less than total
emissions. A zero-proﬁt condition determines the active technologies via complementarity
slackness: PKCi + PXi ≥ PQ ⊥ Qi, where Ci = Ki/Qi is the marginal cost in a unit-proﬁt
function for abatement.
Method 2 (sector-speciﬁc) can be formulated as a complementary pair of abatement cost
and abatable part of emissions after the abatement took place in a given sector:











The reference levels are described by the convex hull data: ¯ Ki = CiQi, ¯ Si = (
P
j Qj) − Qi,
¯ A =
P
i Qi. Thus we do not consider all 24 technology packages shown in Figure 5b, but
only those which could be operated at positive intensity for some set of reference prices.
The reference prices of emission ( ¯ PA, ¯ PU, ¯ PS) are zero, but ¯ PK = 1. The level of
unabatable emission ¯ U is deﬁned in the same way as in the traditional approach.
It is not necessary to assume a positive benchmark level of abatement, as in the traditional
approach. Thus the benchmark abatement cost is zero (K = 0) and the benchmark
emissions level S = A =
P
i Qi implies that there is no abatement initially. In this case,
12unlike with the economy-wide method, there is no dimensionality problem because only
one technology is active in the benchmark. This active technology describes a positive level
of input S and zero level of input K, so, in fact, no abatement takes place since no capital
is applied. In the case of the economy-wide method, no technology can be active in the
benchmark because both inputs (X and K) equal zero.
The advantage of the hybrid approach for both methods is that the marginal abatement
cost curves are based on actual technologies rather than on aggregate ﬂows. In the
engineering view, abatement output is generated from a number of distinct technologies,
each with its own distinct characteristics. Integrating the bottom-up and top-down
modelling via a hybrid approach allows us to consider both the technical information and
the indirect eﬀects at the same time within one model. Due to the price change, inactive
technologies might turn active and formerly active technologies may turn inactive.
This approach allows the inclusion of several environmental themes at the same time,
similar to the traditional approach. It contradicts Dellink et al. (2004) where the authors
claims that the large number of technological options available for pollution reduction
complicates the broad use of hybrid approach. Kiuila (2011) applies three environmental
themes in a CGE model and shows that neither the large number of available technologies
nor the number of environmental themes creates a problem for the discrete technology
modelling (hybrid approach). It is rather a small number of available technologies that
may create a problem as we show in the next section.
4 Numerical example
There are two purposes of numerical experiment. The ﬁrst one is to show the importance
of considering technological possibilities to reduce pollution emission within a CGE models.
The other one is to compare the results of the hybrid and the traditional approach. This
numerical experiment requires a simulation of 6 underlying models, all calibrated to the
same input data:
td - a CGE model with no technological possibility to abate CO2,
td wide - the td model with an economy-wide abatement process under the traditional
approach,
td sect - the td model with a sector-speciﬁc abatement process under the traditional
approach,
bu wide - the td model with an economy-wide abatement process under the hybrid
approach,
bu sect0 - the td model with a sector-speciﬁc abatement process under the hybrid
approach,
13bu sect - the bu sect0 model with the assumption of non-zero abatement level at the
benchmark.
We parametrize our models with 2005 economic data for Switzerland and the abatement
data described in the previous sections. The ﬁrst model is the core model and serves as the
base for the other ﬁve models. Two models with abatement technologies are based on a
CES approximation and three others are based on activity analysis formulations. The
additional model for sector-speciﬁc method is a result of the diﬀerent assumptions between
the traditional and the hybrid approaches. The sector-speciﬁc method requires an
assumption of non-zero abatement level at the benchmark when the traditional approach is
applied (td sect), but there is no such requirement with hybrid approach (bu sect0). In
order to properly compare the two modeling methods we examine two cases for the hybrid
approach: with and without the benchmark abatement level. It is a part of the sensitivity
analysis for the assumptions applied in method 2 (see Section 2.2).
4.1 Core model
The Swiss CGE model (td) is a static framework designed by Imhof and Rutherford (2010)
in a complementarity format with a detailed representation of transportation service. We
have added the possibility to reduce carbon emissions via abatement equipment for LDV,
as discussed in the previous two sections. The structure of the transportation sector is
presented in Figure 2b. By applying diﬀerent abatement approaches described in the
previous sections, we have adjusted the nested structure of this sector accordingly while all
other components are the same for all six models. We assume no abatement activities took
place in 2005 (since no data are available), except for two models (td sect and bu sect)
which require non-zero abatement level at the benchmark. The carbon tax is zero at the
benchmark, because the ﬁrst carbon tax in Switzerland was implemented in 2008.
The supply side of the economy is divided into 54 industries (excluding the abatement
sector) each of which is modeled as representative ﬁrm that produces a single commodity.
The commodities are of two types: transportation (LDV and non-LDV) and
non-transportation. Nested CES technologies account for the substitution possibilities
between six production factors: capital, labor, oil, gas, coal, and electricity. The labor and
capital supplies are ﬁxed. Labor is homogenous and perfectly mobile between sectors, but
other factors are not. A perfectly competitive factor markets are assumed.
Households are collectively modeled as a representative agent who is endowed with factors
of production: labor, capital (but not the capital for abatement because that is represented
by vehicle cost in the case of transportation sector), and abatement capacity (for the
economy-wide method). The government is modeled as a passive entity which demands
public goods, but not public transportation (non-LDV). Both transportation services
14(public and private) are consumed by the representative agent. His preferences are modeled
according to a CES utility function.
The numeraire is the price index of a composite of households’ consumption of
commodities. As Switzerland being small open economy, world prices are not aﬀected by
the Swiss markets. Imports are determined using Armington assumption and the trade
balance is ﬁxed. The benchmark equilibrium describes prices and quantities at a reference
point. Properly calibrated, this point is the same in both the traditional and the hybrid
approaches.
4.2 Scenarios
Switzerland has relatively low CO2 emissions per capita due to its access to hydro and
nuclear power for electricity production. Heating production and gasoline consumption are
responsible for most of the emission. Swiss law requires a 10% reduction of carbon emission
by 2012 from the 1990 level of 40.9 Mt CO2 (BAFU, 2007). The 1990 level was similar to
the benchmark 2005. Using static model, we are only able to see what would have
happened in the economy if this emission target was implemented in 2005.
The key issue in climate policy design is the choice of instruments. In stark terms, there is
a choice between uniform taxation, this is ﬁrst best in the undistorted competitive
economy, and eﬃciency standards, which can be used to correct for systematic errors in the
vehicle choice. The Swiss parliament implemented the tax 12 CHF per ton of CO2 since
2008, but it is applied only to fuels used by stationary sources. For transportation fuels
there is a charge that corresponds to 6 CHF per ton of carbon. Carbon tax revenue is
recycled to households as a lumpsum and to companies as a reduced labour tax, but
transportation fuel charges are in practice not recycled. The current tax rate for stationary
sources is 36 CHF/t CO2.
With our six models, we quantify the eﬀect of the 10% emission reduction using the
following alternative instruments:
• ltax - Uniform carbon tax with labor tax recycling
• lump - Uniform carbon tax with lumpsum revenue recycling
• mandate - Uniform carbon tax with lumpsum revenue recycling and mandate
improvement in LDV energy eﬃciency by 15%
• rentseeking - Auctioned emission permits with 50% cost associated with lobbying
15Considering an emissions tax or emissions permits5, ﬁrms can choose the fraction of the
emissions they wish to abate. It is not necessary that ﬁrms reduce emissions directly
through installation of abatement equipment, they can buy the abatement service from a
specialized company. In CGE models it is only important that ﬁrms have a possibility to
reduce their emission through the use of abatement equipment, but it is not important
which method they choose (such distinction is important in bottom-up models).
The deadweight loss created by carbon taxation can be reduced via tax revenue recycling
to consumers (lump). A carbon tax with the rate at the marginal abatement cost level will
be equivalent to auctioned emission permits if there are no transaction costs. However,
creating a market for emission permits requires some transaction cost. We can take it into
account through a rent-seeking agent that represents additional lawyers hired by ﬁrms once
the market for emission permits is established (rentseeking). The welfare loss of emission
reduction through technological standards will be higher than pure carbon taxation, if the
marginal abatement costs diﬀer signiﬁcantly among ﬁrms but the standards do not. In our
simulation we assume that the technological standards (mandate) will be implemented only
for LDV. On the other hand, the deadweight-loss of carbon taxation can be reduced if
other tax rates are reduced, for example the labour tax (ltax).
4.3 Results
For the purpose of our simulation, we use three possible levels of emissions reduction that
relate to the current Swiss and EU climate policies: 10%, 20%, and 30%. The endogenous
carbon tax is applied uniformly with no exemptions (including households), but the
abatement function is applied only for LDV. Carbon emission caused by LDV represents
33% of benchmark total emissions. Other sectors may reduce emissions only through
demand reduction or input substitution.
We start analysing the results by comparing the methods of integrating the abatement
technologies with in the CGE model. For this purpose we select one out of four policy
instruments - lump - to show the sensitivity of results in terms of abatement possibilities.
Next, we compare the results for the traditional and the hybrid approaches. Lumpsum
recycling is used again as an example. Finally we show the role of selected policy
instruments in the simulated experiment. For this purpose we concentrate on current the
climate policy only, i.e. to move the Swiss economy to the 10% reduction of carbon
emission from the 1990 level.
5For other price mechanisms to reduce negative externalities see Sandholm (2005).
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Figure 6: Simulating carbon emissions reduction with lumpsum recycling
4.3.1 Role of abatement technologies
Figure 6a presents the marginal abatement cost curves without (td) and with the possibility
to reduce emissions via abatement technologies. In addition, the curves includes two other
possibilities to abate: input substitution and output reduction. The curves td sect and
bu sect start from non-zero marginal cost as was explained in the previous section. Beside
this diﬀerence, the ﬁve curves with abatement technologies show similar result for the 10%
emission reduction, but diﬀerent results for additional carbon reduction. The shape of the
MAC curve for td wide also diﬀers from other curves. Let us analyse these diﬀerences.
In each case, there is a great role of abatement technologies in the proper estimation of the
carbon tax rate. Once they are taken into account within a CGE model, the carbon tax
rate is considerably reduced. For example, the 10% emissions reduction requires at most 77
CHF per ton CO2 when LDV abatement technologies are considered instead of 163 CHF
when there are no technological possibilities to abate. Carbon emissions related to LDV
use represent only 33% of total emissions. If we include in the analysis the whole
bottom-up abatement cost curve instead of covering just a part of this curve (only the
technologies related to LDV), the estimated carbon tax rate will be even lower. The range
depends of course on the shape of the original bottom-up cost curve (it is the McKinsey
report (2009) in our case).
For the same reason the economy-wide method (td wide and bu wide) may underestimate
results. Under this method the LDV abatement technologies are addressed to the whole
economy, not just to a speciﬁc sector. It gives wrong opportunity to economy to reach the
emission reduction (when the target is over 10%) compared to the sector-speciﬁc method
(bu sect0). This problem can be solved by including the whole bottom-up abatement cost
curve into the CGE model. It will require a relatively low modelling eﬀort for the
economy-wide method, but not for the sector-speciﬁc one.
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Figure 7: Decompositing the results of simulation with lumpsum recycling
There is a small diﬀerence between the results of the two methods for the lower emission
reduction (under 10%). The carbon tax rate is 53 CHF per ton for bu wide and it is 56 for
bu sect0. The welfare loss is 0.02% in both cases (Figure 6a). Other results are also very
similar because both methods show that the same technology bundles should be involved
to reach the 10% reduction (they are the ﬁrst three technologies in the Table 1). The 20%
reduction requires to employ all available technologies and there is still space for more
abatement. The 30% reduction requires further abatement, but there is no more abatement
technology available. This means that we reach a boundary solution with the hybrid
approach.
It is not the case for the traditional approach as smooth cost curves are used. We discuss it
in the next section. The comparison of the smooth versions (td wide and td sect) is
irrelevant because the sector-speciﬁc method assumes non-zero benchmark carbon tax rate
(12 CHF per ton), while there is no carbon tax in the benchmark with the economy-wide
method. This means that the simulation with the sector-speciﬁc method using the
traditional approach gives greater numbers than with the economy-wide method. For
example, the carbon tax rate is 77 CHF pet ton for td sect, but only 61 for td wide when a
10% reduction is the target.
The diﬀerence increases as emissions reduction increases, because the MAC curve for the
economy-wide method is relatively ﬂat. It is the results of the assumption that LDV
abatement technologies are applied to the whole economy, but not to a speciﬁc sector.
When there are no abatement technologies available, the MAC curve is the steepest (td).
When the technologies are available and it is possible to precisely match technologies with
sectors, then the curve is ﬂatter (td sect). But if we apply the same abatement technologies
not to speciﬁc sectors but to the whole economy (and these abatement technologies not
cover all technological possibilities to abate), the curve will be the ﬂattest.
184.3.2 Traditional versus hybrid approaches
The benchmark equilibrium describes prices and quantities at a reference point. Properly
calibrated, this point is the same in both the traditional and the hybrid approaches.
However the simulated results diﬀer (Figure 6). To clarify the results, we decompose the
MAC curves and analyze how abatement technologies contribute to it’s shape (Figure 7).
Figure 7a shows the benchmark and the counterfactual allocations for the economy-wide
method. The benchmark level is the same for both approaches. The 10% emission
reduction corresponds to 4.03 Mt less of CO2, of which 2.41 Mt will be reduced by
abatement technologies and the rest - by input substitution and demand reduction,
according to the bu wide model. It would be 2.22 Mt according to the td wide. The 5%
diﬀerence in the estimation is a result of approximating the smooth abatement cost curve
by matching the abatement schedule close to the middle point of each step on the step
curve. In the hybrid approach, the point on the right ridge of each step is used. The longer
the steps of the curve, the greater the diﬀerence between both approaches.
For the higher target of emissions reduction, the diﬀerence between the two approaches
increase considerably. For example, the 30% reduction corresponds to a removal of 12.1 Mt
of CO2 of which 4.81 Mt will be removed by abatement technologies according to the
bu wide model, and 8 Mt according to the td wide. The reason lies in the available
abatement technologies: when the hybrid model reaches the last available technology,
further emission reduction is more expensive than with the traditional approach because
the smooth cost curve approaches inﬁnity more slowly. This means that the smooth
approximation of the bottom-up curve is not precise when a policy simulation moves
outside the domain of available abatement options.
Figure 7b illustrates an alternative situation for the sector-speciﬁc method using isoqunats
and isocosts. We illustrate the benchmark and the counterfactual isocost lines, but not the
counterfactual isoquants, in order to keep the ﬁgure readable. The abatement technologies
are related to LDV only and therefore the emissions on the ﬁgure cover only this source.
The benchmark level was 13.85 Mt of CO2 and the 10% target implies a shift to the 10.99
and 10.88 levels for the bu sect and td sect models respectively. As a result, the abatement
level will be 2.71 Mt and 2.59 Mt respectively. This is more than what the economy-wide
approach predicts, because the benchmark abatement level was positive for the
sector-speciﬁc method (0.35 Mt), but zero for the economy-wide method.
Let us now examine why the results diﬀer between the hybrid and the traditional
approach. The benchmark smooth isoquant covers precisely the benchmark convex hull.
But it is not enough to exactly match the simulated results. The characteristics of
abatement technologies are important. The best ﬁt CES elasticity (traditional approach) is
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Figure 8: Instruments choice for 10% emission reduction
that which minimizes the weighted deviation from the bottom-up curve (hybrid approach)
among nearby netput vectors. When the distance between netput vectors is relatively big
(e.g. bundle # 3 in Table 1), the traditional approach may pick the optimal level between
the netput vectors for the counterfactual equilibrium, while the hybrid approach cannot.
As a result, the new allocation will diﬀerent slightly under the two approaches.
For the higher target of emission reduction, the diﬀerence between the two approaches are
caused by the lack of available technologies in the hybrid approach (the same as for the
economy-wide method). Thus higher weights on points (netput vectors) close to the
benchmark produce a better local approximation, whereas higher weights on points far
from the benchmark produce a better discrete approximation at those prices. If we assign
the best ﬁt elasticity (traditional approach) and there is a suﬃcient number of activities
(hybrid approach), then the two approaches will match closely.
This contradicts Boehringer (1998) and Wing (2006) who found that the traditional
approach underestimates costs. The ﬁrst Author found signiﬁcant quantitative and
qualitative diﬀerences in results for input demands between the traditional and the hybrid
approach. The second Author shows that the hybrid speciﬁcation produces less abatement
at a higher welfare cost than the traditional speciﬁcation. We show (Figure 6) that the
opposite is possible. If CES elasticity is (exogenously) set lower than the optimal value, the
cost of abatement in the traditional approach will be higher than in the hybrid approach
(the case of Boehringer (1998) and Wing (2006)). If the CES elasticity is (endogenously)
set at the optimal value, the abatement costs are more or less equivalent for both
approaches (if there is no boundary solution).
204.3.3 Instruments choice
We compare diﬀerent instruments to ﬁnd the lowest cost way to reduce CO2 emission in
Switzerland. Figure 8a shows carbon tax rates (adjusted by the consumer price index) for
the full range of polices described in Section 4.2, all of which target carbon emissions level
reduction at 10%.
In a ﬁrst best world under complete information and no uncertainty and no transaction
cost, either the correct number of permits or the carbon tax rate at the marginal
abatement cost should reach the same eﬃcient abatement level. When market distortions
are taken into account, the theoretical prescription of the most eﬃcient instrument
changes. Figure 8a shows that the marginal cost of carbon emission reduction is the lowest
under emissions permits, even when transaction costs are taken into account (rentseeking).
But transaction costs create a welfare loss (Figure 8b).
Other instruments show result close to zero in terms of welfare cost, but the best result is
for the carbon tax with a labor recycling option (ltax). Our analysis does not take into
account the labour-leisure choice. Once we consider it (Imhof and Rutherford, 2010), the
tax rate decreases by 3%. Generally, the choice of tax revenue recycling scheme has little
inﬂuence on carbon price and welfare cost.
Combining fuel standards with lumpsum recycling (mandate) gives the same eﬀect as using
lumpsum recycling alone (lump). In reality, fuel standards may imply that after we buy
more an eﬃcient car, we want to use it more frequently and the carbon emissions level may
go up. Our simulation does not catch the rebound eﬀect since ours is a static modeling.
The dynamic version with no abatement technologies and no fuel standards (Imhof and
Rutherford, 2010) generates a tax rate that is 9% lower compared with the static version.
The current carbon tax rate in Switzerland is 36 CHF/t and it allows exemptions for
mobile sources. According to our simulation, this rate will not be enough to achieve the
10% targeted. Our calculations are based on the assumption that no exemption will be
applied and there are available abatement technologies for light duty vehicles. These are
one of the cheapest technologies according to the McKinsey study. A uniform carbon tax
should be at least 50 CHF/t according to our results.
5 Conclusion
We explored the methods to incorporate bottom-up abatement cost estimates into
top-down models. Abatement possibilities are usually taken into account implicitly in such
21models. Such approach is diﬀerent than in bottom-up models, since the characteristics of
the technologies and how they are speciﬁed are essential here. The integration of abatement
technologies with top-down modelling allows properly to assess the economic costs of
environmental policies properly. Otherwise the marginal abatement cost is overestimated.
It suggests that the existing analysis of national climate policies shows the upper bound of
costs if only some input substitution and output reductions are possible. When additional
demand on capital is substituted with fuels, it is usually interpreted as an installation of
abatement technologies. The decreasing marginal rate of substitution implies that this way
of abatement is relatively expensive. The explicit representation of the abatement
technologies with top-down models allows us to avoid this problem and decrease the
estimated cost of pollutions abatement. The paper describes two techniques of dealing with
this under a CGE model.
The ﬁrst method - economy-wide - treats an abatement sector as a set of technologies in
the same way as any other sector. This means that producers do not abate themselves but
request services from the abatement sector. An abatement capacity is determined by the
total national emissions, not by the sectorial emissions. It works well provided that it is
not possible to match the bottom-up data with the sectors in the top-down model.
Otherwise it is better to use the second method, where the abatement process is directly
related to a speciﬁc sector, not to the whole economy.
The second method - sector-speciﬁc - considers abatement possibilities as a sectorial
opportunity. The pollution emissions for a given sector is split into an abatable and an
unabatable part. The abatement level is not evaluated directly, as with the ﬁrst method,
but through the distinction between abatable emissions before and after the abatement
process. The calibration process is relatively complicated and it requires an assumption
(for the traditional approach only) of a positive benchmark abatement level.
We demonstrated the traditional and the hybrid approaches with CGE modeling for both
methods. The traditional approach is highly stylized and it is based on a smooth cost
curve described by a CES function. The hybrid approach uses the activity analysis
framework and it is based on a step cost curve described by Leontief functions. The
calibration of abatement function using the traditional approach is a time consuming
process, but it allows a precise replication at the bottom-up curve within its domain. On
the other hand, the hybrid approach may creates a dimensionality problem.
The results for both methods are comparable (bu wide versus bu sect0) for the hybrid
approach if the benchmark abatement levels are similar. The results are diﬀerent when the
traditional approach is applied (td wide versus td sect) because both methods diﬀer in the
deﬁnition of benchmark emissions level. The sector-speciﬁc method assumes a non-zero
abatement level at the benchmark, while the economy-wide method does not. This means
22that if the benchmark emission level is reached with a non-zero carbon tax (td sect), then
the reduction of emissions will require a proportionally higher tax rate, than with the zero
tax rate (td wide) in the benchmark.
Our simulation experiment includes six models calibrated to the same database, but
diﬀerentiated by abatement possibilities. To set up and test the equivalence between the
traditional and the hybrid approach, the parameters of a bottom-up curve should be
speciﬁed endogenously. The usual practice in model building is to pick the substitution
elasticities from literature. This implies diﬀerent results for the two approaches. We show
that a smooth curve precisely calibrated to a step curve should produce virtually the same
results over the entire price domain for both approaches. The diﬀerences appears when
technologies available are few or if the technologies diﬀer extremely in eﬀectiveness.
The precise calibration requires a deﬁnition of an additional optimization problem, where
the set of technology options on the eﬃcient frontier is described through a convex hull
(interior technologies are ignored). We have constructed a convex hull for the
sector-speciﬁc method only because the convex hull is only required when there is a trade
oﬀ (in our example carbon trades oﬀ against other inputs). Constructing a convex hull is
not necessary for the economy-wide method because this method does not provide any
details about substitution possibilities. Instead, an additional optimization problem needs
to be deﬁned in each case in order to determine the parameters for the bottom-up curve
endogenously.
From a bottom-up perspective, hybrid modelling is a simplistic characterization of the way
in which abatement process is actually organized. Substitution possibilities between inputs
(capital versus emission) are described by the characteristics of available technologies,
including those which are inactive in the benchmark. Thus, we integrate top-down
modelling directly with the bottom-up cost curve using zero elasticity of substitution. An
advantage of this approach is the possibility to determine technologies that will be active in
counterfactual equilibria. We cannot do this with the traditional approach, where
elasticities of substitution describe technological options over the entire price domain.
At last, we compared four instruments of climate policy. Our simulation experiment shows
that the theoretical prescription of the most eﬃcient instrument changes when distortions
in markets are taken into account. Emission permits are equivalent to carbon taxation
when no transaction costs are considered. However, a creation of market for emission
permits involves a transaction cost which results in a deadweight loss higher than carbon
taxation.
Swiss governemnt is pollution-averse, according to a deﬁnition by Baldursson and von der
Fehr (2007), since emission taxes are in favour to emission quotas. The current carbon tax
rate in Switzerland is 36 CHF/t of CO2 and many exemptions apply. Our simulation shows
23that this rate will not be enough to reach a 10% emission reduction. If abatement
technologies are available for light duty vehicles and the tax is applied uniformly, the
carbon tax rate should be at least 50 CHF/t. Thus, the current Swiss climate policy would
not reach the emission target.
According to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper with hybrid modelling applied to
abatement sector. We show methods to represent abatement technologies with top-down
modeling. Finally, we prove that the hybrid and the traditional CGE modelling provide
similar results if the calibration process is precisely executed (with endogenous elasticity of
substitution).
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